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US RUSSIA POLICY: TIME TO PUT THE BRAKES ON DEMOCRATIC REFORM
The great struggles of the twentieth century between liberty and totalitarianism ended with a decisive victory for the forces of freedom-and a single sustainable model for national success: freedom, democracy, and free enterprise.
-President George W. Bush Lingering distrust of our motives and policies by key Russian elites slows improvement in our relations. Russia's uneven commitment to the basic values of free-market democracy and dubious record in combating the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction remain matters of great concern. Russia's very weakness limits the opportunities for cooperation.
success: freedom, democracy, and free enterprise." 5 The tremendous challenges facing Russia today have been aggravated by the revolutionary pace of this reform. The United States has further aggravated these problems in many ways. This paper makes the argument that the United States should reassess its policies toward Russia, and toward reforming nations in general.
US/RUSSIA RELATIONS SINCE 1989
Several key events account for the deterioration in US/Russia relations since 1989. It is instructive to look at these events from both the American and Russian viewpoints.
MARGINALIZING RUSSIA IN INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS
The first real order of business in the post-Cold War world was German reunification. A main sticking point between the United States and Soviet Russia was NATO membership.
Chairman Gorbachev initially insisted a reunited Germany must remain neutral, outside of the NATO alliance: "It means a historical enemy in a powerful rival alliance. It comes with no counterbalancing guarantees for our security." 6 Gorbachev was under tremendous pressure not to concede on this issue. In fact, all of Russia's political factions-the communists, the nationalists, and the free-market reformers-were in agreement that NATO membership for
Germany posed a threat to Russian security. 7 In the West, however, the issue was looked at from quite another perspective. is also shared by at least one American analyst. 35 The Clinton administration, in its sixth year, started backing off of many of the economic reform demands, but by then many Russians believed the United States was behind the economic ruin of their country, and more than half of young Russians thought Western assistance was motivated by increasing Russia's dependence on the West. 36 Recently, President George W. Bush renewed the harsh criticism of Russian economic reform and the attempts by President Putin to reel in the oligarchs. 37 
INTERNAL SECURITY
The economic problems fanned the flames of organized crime. The mafia dominates
Russian business and industry, 38 and Russians, already conditioned to distrust the excesses of capitalism, have become even more wary of free-market reform. In 1993, Russia's Chief
Justice railed against the rapid economic reform, warning the country was fast turning into a mafia state. 39 Government and law enforcement officials were known for taking bribes. 40, 41 The government was so cash-strapped that it couldn't pay the Russian military, which started making threats. 42 Russian soldiers could be found begging and stealing. Understandably, the readiness rate of the Russian military plummeted, and Russian national pride suffered through several embarrassing failures in military operations: the Kursk rescue during which the Russian military was incapable of doing anything yet too proud to ask for foreign assistance until it was too late; 43 the bloody insurrection in Chechnya; the botched rescue of hostages held in a
Moscow theater by Chechnyan terrorists, during which Russian authorities used an ostensibly non-lethal gas which killed 117 hostages; 44 and finally the Beslan school terrorist incident where 405 out of 1220 hostages were killed in the crossfire between the terrorists and Russian authorities. 45 Russia considered the move against the Chechnyan insurrection an internal security issue and a needed anti-terrorist measure, and no business of anyone outside Russia. However, the US State Department and the European Union harshly criticized Russia's handling of the action, pushing for outside mediation and accusing Russia of excessive use of force. 46, 47 In the wake of the Beslan horror, President Putin instituted a wide-range of measures to increase security, including strengthening anti-corruption laws and consolidating national security and anti-terrorism forces. 48 These measures were similar to those implemented by the United States in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks of September, 2001. President Putin also suspended popular election of the governors of Russia's recalcitrant autonomous republics.
Instead he will now nominate them for approval by the local legislatures. 49 In the Russian view, the move was a necessary step to restore security in the long-term evolution of Russia's democratic reform. 50 But the Bush administration interpreted this action as a serious threat to democratic reform, and criticism came from both the State Department and President Bush himself.
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PREREQUISITES FOR FREEDOM, DEMOCRACY, AND FREE ENTERPRISE
In searching for a less antagonistic approach toward Russia and its reform, it is useful first to examine the work of political philosophers concerning the purpose of government and those factors which promote successful democratic reform.
CHECKS AND BALANCES
Democracy is no panacea. From its beginnings in ancient Greece, scholars have warned against its excesses. Plato did not believe ordinary citizens should have a hand in state affairs as they were not qualified; it should be left to professional "Philosopher-Kings" to rule. His convictions resulted from the trial of his mentor, Socrates, who was sentenced to death by a democratic jury. 52 Plato's student Aristotle believed that under ideal conditions, the best type of government was an aristocracy of the nation's most virtuous citizens. 53 Concerning democracy,
Aristotle preferred a hybrid of oligarchy and democracy called politeia. Politeia was democracy with a set of measures implemented to protect the minority, especially the educated, wealthy
class, who had the most to offer society, and likewise the most to lose if the poor, uneducated majority organized against them.
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Thus the Greek masters understood that unchecked, democracy can devolve into mob rule. This was manifestly evident in the French Revolution of 1789, where the monarchy was overthrown, but the republic that replaced it very soon devolved into one of the most despotic terrorist regimes in recorded history. In the long run, it set the stage for democratic reform throughout Europe, but in the short-term, it set the conditions for Napoleon's rise to imperial autocratic power. If not managed properly, democracy can create a chaos which makes autocracy very attractive by comparison. Effective checks and balances are essential.
In the American experience, the founding fathers built on the lessons of history to set up a representative constitutional democracy-a federal republic-with an elaborate system of checks and balances to prevent devolution into mob rule or autocracy. The US system of checks and balances serves to prevent too much power from being wielded by the executive or the legislature. The legislature makes laws and limits the power of the executive. The executive holds veto power over the legislature. The judiciary limits the law-making power of the legislature by interpreting the constitution, protecting the constitutional rights of the minority from the majority, and vice-versa.
In contrast, Russia has a weak system of checks and balances. There is weak accountability of politicians to the electorate, as evidenced by the fact that the President, Prime
Minister, and Duma have yet to be chosen in the same way in successive changes of government. Additionally, the Duma has been incapable of holding the president and ministers accountable.
SECURITY AND THE RULE OF LAW
Throughout the ages, political philosophers such as St Augustine, Luther, Machiavelli, Bodin, and Hobbes, wrote that a government must first provide safety and security, with justice and freedom relegated to secondary concerns. 56 In an anarchic international system, the state must provide basic security and prosperity or risk its survival, and a democratic government is no exception. Kenneth N. Waltz, in his synthesis of historical thought in political philosophy, "Man, the State, and War," concludes:
In times of relative quiescence the question men put is likely to be: What good is life without justice and freedom? Better to die than live like a slave. In times of domestic troubles, of hunger and civil war, of pressing insecurity, however, many will ask: Of what use is freedom without a power sufficient to establish and maintain conditions of security? …If the alternative to tyranny is chaos and if chaos means a war of all against all, then the willingness to endure tyranny becomes understandable. In the absence of order there can be no enjoyment of liberty.
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And while justice and freedom may be secondary as basic concerns of people and states, they are by definition essential to achieving "the single sustainable model for national success:
freedom, democracy, and free enterprise. 60 which has grave economic implications for Russia since much of its natural resources, including vast oil reserves, lie in these regions.
Beyond the security issues facing Russian citizens daily, the Russian government itself was almost toppled three times since the reforms began. In 1991, a coup by Soviet hard-liners was unsuccessful in deposing Mikhael Gorbachev and his agenda of reform. In 1993, Boris
Yeltsin survived an armed coup, including a tank attack on the Russian Parliament building. 61 And finally, in 1996, the Communists were nearly elected back into power. Only a last-minute alliance between Yeltsin and the oligarchs prevented reversion to a Soviet state. In return for their support, Yeltsin gave seven of the oligarchs the inside track on state divestiture of some natural resources, businesses, and media facilities. 62 Thus Yeltsin had to compromise democratic and free market reforms to save their framework.
And finally, most Russian officials grew up with the cronyism of the corrupt communist political system. According to Marshall Goldman's analysis, because of this culture, neither the government nor the business sector in Russia respects the rule of law. 63 
PROSPERITY
In a free society, prosperity aids in establishing the rule of law. Without substantial middleclass wealth, the people do not have a stake in the social order, and will not demand the rule of law in their leaders. "Laws alone, without public pressure to enforce them, will seldom be effective." 64 Again, Russia's situation is dire. Russia lacks prosperity. The economy has shrunk since the fall of the Soviet Union. Goldman concludes that economic reform in Russia will not progress until an independent middle class develops. 65 
CONSENSUS OF DEMOCRATIC POLITICAL PARTIES
Stephen White, Richard Rose, and Ian McAllister set out one additional criterion for stable democracy: the absence of major anti-democratic political parties. 66 This factor correlates closely to the others. If a democratic government does not have appropriate checks and balances, and cannot provide adequate security and prosperity for its citizens, the people will seek alternative forms of government.
Russia fails here too. Some of Russia's major political factions are in fact quite antidemocratic, and with the apparent failure of democratic and free-market reforms, these parties are gaining in strength. The government has been so ineffective that half of all Russians believe democracy is not compatible with Russian tradition, according to a 1995 poll. 67 The Soviet system allowed only one political party, and elections were simply charades to The American Revolution was not so much a revolution as one step along America's evolution toward the three pillars enshrined in our National Security Strategy-freedom, democracy, and free enterprise. Unlike the citizens of the French Revolution, the Weimar or Kerensky Republics, Yugoslavia, or contemporary Russia, the American colonists were not starting from scratch. Many of the factors for successful reform were well entrenched in colonial society before the Declaration of Independence. First, there was already a large, prosperous middle class of merchants with a high stake in independence from British taxes. Second, the American colonies, part of the mercantile British Empire, already had a strong tradition of free enterprise. Third, although the colonists were denied many of the freedoms British subjects enjoyed in England, the British system of parliamentary democratic government was well established by 1776, and part of the culture inherited by the colonists. And finally, the framers of the new republic had studied other democratic societies intensely, and set up an intricate system of checks and balances to prevent abuses. These factors helped ensure the success of the American adoption of more freedom for its citizens, and democratic government without a monarch. And beyond all those positive factors, none of which Russia has, George Washington established the most important norm for the Executive Branch when he declined the overtures of many to grant him autocratic powers in those troubled times.
The former Soviet-block Eastern European states took various paths to reform, and those that chose a less revolutionary pace have outperformed the others. Czechoslovakia was very aggressive, but got ahead of its ability to regulate privatization of government-controlled industry. A risky voucher system for financing privatized industries went awry, derailed by a greedy opportunist who made off with 200 million dollars and set back reform several years. 75 Poland's program was the most successful for several reasons. First, it managed to resist the collectivization of its farms while under Soviet influence, 76 and in defiance of the Soviet government had been implementing some other free-market reforms since 1982. 77 So its agricultural and business sectors already had a modest tradition of free enterprise. Second, there was much internal debate and thought put into just how to privatize effectively. Poland's privatization program was structured from the start to prevent favoritism, corruption, mafia influence, and monopolies from controlling too much. And third, under the leadership of President George H. W. Bush, the United States initially encouraged a slow pace of reform in
Poland to avoid chaos. 78 Resisting later IMF pressure, Poland proceeded deliberately and gradually. 79 Poland's reform planning is now held up as a model. It was the only former Sovietblock nation to achieve positive GNP growth every year from 1992 to 2000. 80 Poland's success was all the more remarkable for having concurrently dealt with additional economic pressure from both the European Union and NATO, to meet their membership standards. Poland spent $15.7 billion to meet NATO standards alone. 81 China is perhaps the best example of evolutionary democratic and free-market reform.
China's controlled free-market reform program dates back to 1972, and is slowly creating a large middle class. This middle class is clamoring for more and more democratic reform.
Despite the brutal 1989 Tiananmen Square massacre, in which up to 500 student demonstrators were killed, this event, ironically, highlights some positive trends. The students demonstrated that there is a popular movement for more democratic reform, growing stronger as the middle class expands. It also demonstrated that elements of the Chinese Army are sympathetic. President George H. W. Bush's response was basically token sanctions, while maintaining China's Most-Favored-Nation status. He was widely criticized as being too weak in protesting the massacre. 82, 83 Despite this criticism, however, he proceeded to pursue a policy of engagement with China, which he explained in a commencement speech he gave at Yale in 1991. He believed that only continued constructive engagement with China would encourage more free-market reform, and with that increasing wealth would come a stronger foundation for peaceful, democratic reform. 84 Wisely, as with Poland, he was willing to let reform in China come at an evolutionary pace.
CLOSE CALLS FOR DEMOCRACY
History is also full of examples of existing democratic states being rescued by carefully planned economic assistance-the fostering of prosperity and the development of a large middle class as a way of maintaining stability and preventing social unrest.
America's own experience during the Great Depression is a prime example. Many historians describe the depression as the complete failure of free-market capitalism.
Communist and fascist political philosophies were gaining appeal among a growing number of • Revise the National Security Strategy to remove any antagonistic language about a US/Russia relationship of distrust. US policymakers need to quit viewing Russia as the traditional enemy, and focus on mutual interests, such as fighting transnational terrorism, and making democracy work.
• Encourage the reforms of President Putin, as interim measures to provide security by combating terrorism and the mafia, ensuring positive control of weapons of mass destruction, and growing credible government institutions with proper checks and balances to mitigate corruption.
• Foster a closer bi-lateral military alliance with Russia, in addition to the multi-lateral Partnership for Peace, to assist its military in achieving an increased state of readiness to protect its borders, become partners in fighting trans-national terrorism, and guaranteeing the control of its weapons of mass destruction.
• Help Russia grow a large, prosperous, multi-ethnic middle class, through Marshall-Plan style economic aid if necessary. Initial US assistance or aid could take the form of helping Russia bust up the monopolies built by the oligarchs, establishing a Securities and Exchange Commission to regulate and protect investors, and restoring the value of pension plans lost during the rampant inflation of the 1990s. In essence, this is similar to the approach the United States is taking with Iraq today, providing a massive infusion of economic aid to ensure a successful transition to democracy. The investment in Russia should be considered much less risky though, because Russian leadership has demonstrated a strong desire to reform, initiated from within.
• Once the middle class has been established, assist Russia in instituting full democratic reform.
• Once the economic development and reform are complete, push for Russia NATO membership.
• Finally, the United States should learn from the experiences of reform in China and Russia, and form similar strategies for averting economic disaster and regional instability when inevitable reform comes to North Korea, Cuba, and Iran.
CONCLUSION
US/Russia relations have deteriorated since the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991. Much of the antagonism between the two countries has come from US criticism of Russian policies.
While some of this criticism was justified by US national interests-the security of nuclear weapons, arms sales, and nuclear assistance to Iran-much was the result of US insensitivity to the Russian situation and impatience with the pace of Russian reform.
The Russian people, under the progressive leadership of Mikhael Gorbachev, Boris Yeltsin, and Vladimir Putin, have demonstrated a bold, brave commitment to freedom, democracy and free enterprise, despite lacking the essential ingredients for successful reform.
History shows that without these essential ingredients, Russia's chances of succeeding in this endeavor are not good.
History also shows that people need security, both physical and economic, before the luxury of democratic civil liberties. A prosperous middle class, with a stake in a free-market social order, both facilitates democratic reform in autocratic societies and works against reversion to authoritarian rule in democratic societies. President George H. W. Bush understood this, as demonstrated in his policies encouraging evolutionary, vice revolutionary, economic reform in both Poland and China.
Russia's success in implementing reform is vital to US national interests. This paper recommends a new, constructive policy to encourage slower, deliberately planned, evolutionary reform in Russia, focusing on internal security first, then prosperity, then full democratic reform.
Without such a measured approach, Russia will surely remain on the brink. Thrice since 1989, it has survived a reversion to authoritarian rule. Russia could very soon find itself in the same situation as Spain in 1936, with a grim choice between communist victory at the polls or nationalist dictatorship, and the real possibility of civil war.
In short the United States should revisit the original intent of President George H. W.
Bush: "It's time to build on our new relationship with [Russia] , to endorse and encourage a peaceful process of internal change toward democracy and economic opportunity." 89 And as contrary as it may be to our national character, we should be very patient in waiting for Russia to get there.
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